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"Si un travail vaut la peine d'etre fait, autant le faire bien"
-French

adage

"Whatever is worth doing at all, is worth doing well"
-Philip

Dormer Stanhope, Earl of Chesterfield (1746)
I. INTRODUCTION

The European Union Constitution' (Constitution) was born of a desire to reorganize and simplify the existing EU Treaties in anticipation of
the European Union's (EU or Union) addition of ten new Member States
in 2004.2 Its ratification is still in process at the time of publication of
this Article,3 but the Constitution is intended to become the new foundational instrument for the EU.
The internal dynamics of the expanded Union and the external economic and geopolitical forces pressing against it will test the new
Constitution, and it is premature to predict whether the instrument, if
ratified, will serve the Union well. Nevertheless, one thing that can be
done now is to evaluate the Constitution as a document. It can be analyzed in terms of its organization, its consistency, and its readability. Has
it been well crafted? Is it more approachable than the Treaties? Is it a
fitting product of the process that created it?
As background for this critique of the Constitution, Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of the existing EU Treaties, their
shortcomings, and the political processes that culminated in the creation
of the new Constitution. Of particular interest are certain goals articu1.
TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, DEC. 16, 2004, O.J. (C3 10)
1 (2004) [hereinafter CoNsT.]. The European Union is the latest name for the organization that
has been known as the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy
Community, the European Economic Community and the European Community. Although it
is currently appropriate to refer to the European Community in relation to much of the body's
activity, the name European Union is now in general use. Under the new Constitution, the
European Union would legally succeed the European Community, and the term European
Union would be used exclusively. CONST. art. IV-438. (For convenience, this Article will simply refer to the entity as the European Union, the EU, or the Union).
2.
The nations that acceded on May 1, 2004 are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. EUROPA,
Enlargement, The Accession Process, available at http://www.europa.eu.intcomml
enlargement/negotiations/accession.rocess.htm.
3.
The Constitution was approved by the Intergovernmental Conference on June 18,
2004 and signed on October 29, 2004. If ratification is not completed within two years of the
date or signing, the European Council will take up the matter. Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, IGC 2003-Meeting of Heads of State or
Government, Brussels, 17/18 June 2004, CIG 81/04 at 88 (2004).
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lated for the new document, such as the desire to replace the complex
Treaties with a simpler, more approachable instrument. Part III is a summary of the Constitution's textual content, details that are necessary to
illuminate the analysis that follows. Part IV offers a critical review of the
awkward manner in which the Constitution is organized. In particular, it
focuses on the confusion created by scattering related provisions
throughout the various parts of the document. Part V proposes two possible solutions to this drafting problem. One would maintain most of the
present text but with many of the overlapping parts merged together. The
second would eliminate much of the Constitution's detail in favor of a
more basic statement of critical principles. The conclusion is that the
Constitution as written is not as effective as it could be, and that its quality as a document does not match its importance as an expression of
political will.
II. THE GENESIS OF THE CONSTITUTION
A. The Existing EU T7reaties
The Constitution is intended to replace the EU's primary constituent
documents, the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
4
(EC Treaty) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The treaties have
been a work in progress, the subject of regular amendment,' but in their
evolution, they have grown to be increasingly complex.
The EC Treaty is the latest version of the Treaty of Rome. It establishes the European Community, and it contains most of the provisions
6
defining the body's institutions and regulating the common market. The
TEU creates the European Union, which essentially retains and shares
the EC Treaty's institutional provisions. It also leaves in place the EC

CONST. art. IV-437. The principal treaties are: TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EURO4.
PEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, O.J. (C 340) 173 (1957) and TREATY ON
EUROPEAN UNION (MAASTRICHT), Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1 (1992), each of which has
been amended to its most current version by the TREATY OF NICE AMENDING TREATY ON
EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN

Feb. 26, 2001, O.J. (C 80) (2001) [hereinafter TREATY OF NICE] [the principal
treaties in their current versions are respectively referred to hereinafter as EC TREATY and
RELATED ACTS,

TEU].

The major amendments have included: TREATY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL
5.
AND A SINGLE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Merger Treaty), Apr. 8, 1965,
O.J. (L 152) (1965); SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, Feb. 7, 1986, O.J. (L 169) (1986); TREATY OF
AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS,
(1997); TREATY OF NICE.
EC TREATY pt. III.
6.

Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1
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Treaty's economic provisions as the "first pillar" of a broader system.'
The TEU expands the scope of activity, however, by establishing a second pillar relating to common foreign and security policy and a third
pillar governing police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
Awkwardly, the operative entity for the first pillar is still the European
Community, while the European Union acts under the second and third
pillars. Nevertheless, despite this technical distinction, it is common to
refer to the EU when describing any activity relating to any pillar.
Criticisms of the EU treaty structure are not new, but one of the most
apt comments has come from British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, writing even as the Constitutional Convention was underway:
While the practical achievements of the EU have been profound,
the Union's treaties fail almost every test of clarity and brevity
...For a start, there is not one constitution, but two. One "on
European union," the other "establishing the European community." . . . [b]oth have overlapping preambles with "objectives,"
"tasks," and "principles." As for the institutional arrangements,
they are shared between the two treaties. These complex texts
make the case for a single, coherent constitution for the EU...
real reform is urgently needed. 9
Other commentators have referred to the Treaties as a "hodgepodge"'
and an "ad hoc and often incoherent set of documents.""
B. Callsfor Simplification of the Treaties
The drive for a new constitution was born of such frustrations. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, in a seminal address on May 12,
2000, at Humboldt University in Berlin,'2 expressed his concerns that the
7.
The Treaties do not actually refer to "pillars." Article 1 of the TEU states: "The
Union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and
forms of cooperation established by this Treaty." TEU art. 1. The first pillar covers the entirety
of the European Community's traditional common market activity. See NEILL NUGENT, THE
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

69 (2003). See also Deirdre Curtin,
The ConstitutionalStructure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces, 30 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 17, 22-30 (1993).
8.
TEU arts. 11-28 (second pillar), 29-42 (third pillar).
9.
Jack Straw, Special Report: A Constitutionfor Europe, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 12,
2002, at 55.
10.
Simon Heifer & Edward Heathcoat Amory, Blueprintfor Tyranny, DAILY MAIL
(London), May 8, 2003, at 12.
11.
UnconventionalWisdom, TIMES LONDON, May 14, 2003, at 23.
12.
Joschka Fischer, From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of
European Integration, Speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin 4 (May 12, 2000) available at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/reden/redene/
r000512b-rO08e.pdf.

Winter 20051

Worth Doing Well

3
Union was in danger of becoming "utterly intransparent"' He asserted
that "productive steps" should be taken to complete the process of integration, 4 and he proposed "the transition from a union of states to full
parliamentarization as a European Federation." 5 He added: "This Federation will have to be based on a constituent treaty," and he urged
' 6
moving beyond the "fears and formulae of the 1 th and 2 0 th centuries"' to
a Europe "established anew with a constitution ... centred around basic,
human and civil rights, an equal division of powers between the European institutions and a precise delineation between European and nationstate level."' 7
Fischer's call received a response in early 2001 from the InterGovernmental Conference (IGC) that approved the Treaty of Nice,
8
which is now the latest manifestation of the EC Treaty and TEU.1 The
Conference appended to the Treaty a declaration that called for a "deeper
9
and wider debate about the future of the European Union."' Among the
basic issues to be addressed in this debate was "a simplification of the
Treaties with a view to making them clearer and better understood without changing their meaning." 20 The Nice Declaration indicated that a
further pronouncement from the European Council would be forthcom2
ing at its December 2001 meeting in Laeken, Belgium. '
In July of 2001, the Commission entered the discussion by publish22
ing its White Paper on European Governance, which asserted: "Many
people are losing confidence in a poorly understood and complex system
to deliver the policies that they want. 23 Among the "principles of good
governance" to which the EU should aspire, openness and coherence
were listed as critical to making EU policy "accessible" and "easily understood." 24 The Commission, however, observed that these principles
were not being followed: "The European Union's policies and legislation
are getting increasingly complex., 25 Therefore, a call was issued for
"a comprehensive programme of simplification of existing rules ...
9

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.at 6-7.
Id.at 4.
Id.at7.
Id.at 7.
Id.at9.

18.

TREATY OF NICE.

European Council, Declaration on the future of the Union, Mar. 10, 2001, O.J. (C
19.
80) 85 [hereinafter Nice Declaration].
Id.at 86.
20.
Id. at85.
21.
European Governance: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council,
22.
COM (01) 428 final at 10 [hereinafter White Paper].
Id.at 3.
23.
Id.at 10.
24.
Id.
at 18.
25.
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regrouping legal texts, removing redundant or obsolete provisions, and
shifting non-essential obligations to executive measures. 26 The Commission committed that it would "[slimplify further existing EU law" 27 and
propose appropriate "Treaty changes" or "constitutional reform" to the
European Council at the upcoming IGC in Laeken. s
As anticipated, on December 14-15, 2001, the European Council issued its Declaration on the Future of the European Union (the Laeken
Declaration).29 The document observed that EU citizens "are calling for a
clear, open, effective, democratically controlled Community approach,' 30
and it described the need for clearer division of competence between the
Union and the Member States, simplification of EU legislation and more
democracy, transparency and efficiency in Union institutions." The crux
of the problem, according to the Declaration, was a need for simplification of the Union's Treaties:
The European Union currently has four Treaties. 2 The objectives, powers and policy instruments of the Union are currently
spread across those Treaties. If we are to have greater transparency, simplification is essential.
Four sets of questions arise in this connection. The first concerns
simplifying the existing Treaties without changing their content.
Should the distinction between the Union and the Communities
be reviewed? What of the division into three pillars?
Questions then arise as to the possible reorganisation of the
Treaties. Should a distinction be made between a basic treaty
and the other treaty provisions? Should this distinction involve
separating the texts? Could this lead to a distinction between the
amendment and ratification procedures for the basic treaty and
for the other treaty provisions?
26.
Id. at 23.
27.
Id. at 5.
28.
Id. at 34-35.
29.
European Council, Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, in
Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001,
Annex I, SN300/1/01
REV I at 19, 20 (Dec. 15, 2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/futururndocuments/offtext/docl51201 en.htm [hereinafter Laeken Declaration].

30.

Id. at 4.

31.
Id. at 4-6.
32.
In addition to the EC Treaty and TEU, the other treaties in effect in 2001 were the
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and the Treaty
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC lapsed as a separate
treaty in 2002, and its assets, liabilities and programs were transferred to the European Com-

munity. Under the Constitution, EURATOM would remain in effect, amended by the
Constitution.
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Thought would also have to be given to whether the Charter of
Fundamental Rights should be included in the basic treaty and to
whether the European Community should accede to the European Convention on Human Rights.
The question ultimately arises as to whether this simplification
and reorganisation might not lead in the long run to the adoption
of a constitutional text in the Union. What might the basic features of such a constitution be? The values which the Union
cherishes, the fundamental rights and obligations of its
33 citizens,
Union?
the
in
States
Member
between
the relationship
The Laeken Declaration called for a Convention on the Future of Europe
to be convened in 2002, to produce a document that would provide a
"starting point" for discussions at the next IGC. 3
C. The Convention
In the inaugural session of the Convention, on February 26, 20002,
Chairman Valery Giscard d'Estaing warned that "[t]he process of European union is showing signs of flagging.... The decision-making
machinery has become more complex, to the point of being unintelligible to the general public., 35 He referred to a "tangled skein of powers
[and] the complexity of procedures,0 6 and commented: "We shall have
aim
to respond to the request for simplification of the Treaties, with the
' 37
of achieving a single Treaty, readable by all, understandable by all.
On July 18, 2003, seventeen months after Giscard d'Estaing's opening address, he and his fellow Convention representatives produced the
Constitution under the title of "Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution

Laeken Declaration, supra note 29, at 6-7.
33.
34.
Id. at 7-9.
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Introductory Speech to the Convention on the Future of
35.
Europe 5 (Feb. 26, 2002) available at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/l.pdf
[hereinafter Giscard d'Estaing].
36.
Id. at 7. During the Convention Giscard d'Estaing observed that his study of the
Mandarin language was easier than mastering the EU Treaties and agreements. Christopher
Dickey & Michael Meyer, Is Europe Broken?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 12, 2002, at 14.
37.
Giscard d'Estaing, supra note 35, at 11. As the Convention proceeded, Jean-Luc
Dehaene echoed Giscard d'Estaing's sentiments as follows: "If, in the Convention, we succeed
to make the EU, its Treaty and its texts, its procedures and its processes, more 'understandable,' we will have helped to remove a major obstacle that stand[s] in the way of achieving
informed interest and involvement of citizens with EU affairs." Jean-Luc Dehaene, Vice President of the European Convention, Understanding Europe: The EU Citizen's Right to Know,
Speech Before the Conference Organized by the Friends of Europe in Brussels 6 (Apr. 3,
2003), availableat http://european-convention.eu.intldocs/speeches/8285.pdf.

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 26:587

for Europe."38 Although the assembly's procedures were criticized,39 and
although some commentators questioned whether there had been true
accord among the delegates,4" the Convention's Praesidium was able to
claim that it had accomplished what the Laeken Declaration had mandated, and it referred the document to the European Council as the
product of "broad consensus,"'
III. THE

FRUITS OF THE CONVENTION

A. Organizationof the ConstitutionalText

The Constitution begins with a Preamble that describes the Union's
heritage and objectives. The body of the document is divided into four
parts: Part I, which is untitled, broadly defines the Union, its competences and its institutions. Part II is captioned "The Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the Union." Part Ill is entitled "The Policies and
Functioning of the Union." Part IV contains "General and Final Provisions." Various protocols and declarations follow the Constitution's text.
38.
Peter Norman has written an invaluable on-the-scene account of the Convention
from inception to adjournment. His book supplies great detail about the activities of Giscard
d'Estaing's Praesidium, the various working groups, and the plenary sessions, including the
mechanics of drafting the Constitution and the politics of negotiating its more controversial
provisions. See PETER NORMAN, THE ACCIDENTAL CONSTITUTION-THE STORY OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION

(2003).

39.
The Convention's plenary sessions were held only once or twice per month, and
generally for no more than two days per session. See the official website for the European
Convention, at http://european-convention.eu.int/sessplan.asp?lang=EN. Larry Siedentop has
commented that the meetings were not "frequent enough for members to come up with new
ideas. Intimacy is needed for such a group to develop a mind of its own." Larry Siedentop, We
the People Do Not Understand, FIN. TIMES, June 5, 2003, at 21. Another commentator has
referred to a "serious truncation and imbalance in the Convention's debates." Kirsty Hughes, A
Dynamic and Democratic EU or Muddling Through Again?, THE FEDERAL TRUST ONLINE
PAPER 3
(August 2003), available at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/constitution/
25_03.pdf.
40.
No votes were taken at the Convention's plenary meetings. Daniel Dombey &
George Parker, Dual Ambitions, FIN. TIMES, May 24, 2002, at 13. Giscard d'Estaing was accused of inventing consensus where it hardly existed and brushing aside dissenting voices. Id.
See also George Parker, PoliticalLeaders Are Startingto Take Seriously Discussionson a New
Constitutionfor an Enlarged Union, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2002, at 13. Three Benelux delegates wrote that they "deplored the procedure followed." Letter from the Benelux countries to
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Chairman of the European Convention (Apr. 25, 2003) (on file with
the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs), available at http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?
CMSITEM=64E844AE637C4B2E89B3957CE2028F89X88X67360X33. A Finnish government representative described the workings of the Convention as "extremely ugly to watch."
Teija Tiilikainen, FinnishDelegates Reject Draft EU Constitution, HELSINGIN SANOMAT (Helsinki), July 10, 2003, availableat http://www.helsinki-hs.net/.

41.

DRAFT

TREATY ESTABLISHING.A

CONSTITUTION

FOR EUROPE,

July

18, 2003,

(CONV 850/03), availableat http://european-convention.eu.int/Treaty/cvOO850.enO3.pdf.
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1. Part I: Untitled

42

Part I is apparently intended as an overview of the European Union.
Such a feature was absent in the Treaties, and this introduction may reflect the desire for a "basic treaty" as referred to in the Laeken
Declaration. Part I consists of sixty articles in nine titles:
Title I-Definition and Objectives of the Union. 43 These eight provi-

sions create the Union, grant it legal personality, affirm the primacy of
EU law over Member State law, and identify the Union's values and objectives, while acknowledging respect for the integrity of the Member
States.
Title II-Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the Union." This

brief section of two articles describes the EU's commitment to human
rights and presages the Charter of Fundamental Rights in Part II of the
Constitution. It also creates and defines EU citizenship.
Title 111-Union Competences." Clearly responding to a demand in
the Laeken Declaration, these eight articles define what the EU may do,
both in terms of its exclusive competences and with regard to competences shared with the Member States.46 These are critical concepts, on
the one hand confirming Union authority and on the other hand underscoring that powers not specifically conferred to the EU are reserved to
the Member States.
Title IV-The Union's Institutions.47 In straightforward terms, these
fourteen provisions describe the institutions, their composition and their
responsibilities. Correcting an omission in the Treaties, the European
48
Council is for the first time formally identified as an EU institution.
The new positions of a permanent European Council President and Union Minister for Foreign Affairs are established. 9 Groups of three
Member States will share presidencies of the Council for eighteen
months, rather than rotating to a single State every six months, 50 and the
42.
CONST. arts. I-1-1-60.
Id. at arts. 1-1-1-8.
43.
Id. at arts. 1-9-1-10.
44.
Id. at arts. 1-11-1-18.
45.
For a detailed examination of the Constitution's balancing of EU authority versus
46.
Member State authority, see Stephen C. Sieberson, How the New European Union Constitution Will Allocate Power between the EU and its Member States-A Textual Analysis, 37
VAND.

J. TRANSNAT'L L. 993 (2004).

CONST. arts. 1-19-1-32. In the Constitution the European Council is always referred
47.
to with its full name, while in all provisions after Article 1-19, the Council of Ministers is
referred to as the "Council" and the European Commission is referred to as the "Commission." See CONST. art. 1-19(1). This article will generally follow those usage conventions.
CONST. arts. 1-19, 1-21.
48.
Id. at arts. 1-22, 1-28.
49.
50.
Id. at art. 1-24(7). Note that each of the three countries will chair all configurations
of the Council (except Foreign Affairs) for a period of six months within the 18-month term.
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Commission will be reduced in size to less than one commissioner per
Member State.5 ' This title also includes the controversial new formula
for qualified majority voting on the European Council and Council.
Title V-Exercise of Union Competence. 3 Significantly simplifying
the Treaties, these twelve articles reduce the number of EU legal instruments to six-European laws, European framework laws, European
regulations, European decisions, recommendations and opinions.54 This
title describes which institution may adopt these measures, and it describes the procedures for such activity. An important procedural
development is that legislative co-decision by the European Parliament
becomes the norm.5 Furthermore, several provisions provide specific
guidelines for Union action in common foreign and security policy,
Draft Decision of the European Council on the Exercise of the Presidency of the Council of
Ministers, Annex 8 art. 1, Meeting of Heads of State or Government, Brussels, 17/18 June
2004, CIG 81/04 (2004), available at http://ue.eu.int/icgpdf/en/O4/cgOO/cgOOO81.enOfpdf
Arguably, this is not significantly different from the current system, in which the immediate
past-president and the upcoming president coordinate with the current president. The participation of the same three Member States for the full 18-month term may well offer a greater
measure of consistency and coordination than is currently the case, but the complete replacement of the team every 18 months may also prove disruptive.
51.
The first Commission appointed under the Constitution will consist of one commissioner per Member State. CoNsT. art. 1-26(5). This appointment will not occur until 2009.
Thereafter, beginning with the Commission appointed in 2014, the size of the body will be a
number corresponding to two-thirds of the Member States, selected on the basis of equal rotation among the States. CONST. art. 1-26(6).
52.
The Constitution's QMV formula represents a departure from the weighted voting
formulas inserted into the EC Treaty through the Treaty of Nice. EC TREATY art. 205. The
formula proposed by the Convention was a majority of Member States representing threefifths of the EU population, but this had been blocked by Spain and Poland at the December
2003 meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference. Thomas Fuller, Split on Weighted Voting
Sinks EU Charter Talks, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 15, 2003, at 1. The IGC meetings of June
2004 revised the formula to give greater voice to the smaller states. The final version requires
the votes of 55% of Council Members, representing at least 15 Member States and comprising
at least 65% of the EU population. CONST. art. 1-25(1). In addition a "blocking minority" must
include representatives of at least four Member States. Id. In certain instances the voting requirement is 72% of Council members representing at least 65% of the Union population.
CONST. art. 1-25(2).
53.
CorsT. arts. 1-33-1-44.
54.
Id. at art. 1-33. The Constitution's forms of legislation are similar to the five types
currently provided under Article 249 of the EC Treaty, with the addition of "European regulations" as a new form of action. EC TREATY art. 249.
55.
The Constitution expands the areas of co-decision from 37 to approximately 80
subjects. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Oral Report Presented to the European Council in Thessaloniki, SN 173/03 at 11 (June 20, 2003) available at http://european-convention.eu.int/
docs/speeches/9604.pdf. This increase is created through Article 1-34(1), which provides that
"European laws and European framework laws shall be adopted, on the basis of proposals
from the Commission, jointly by the European Parliament and the Council under the ordinary
legislative procedure as set out in Article 111-396." CoNrsT. art. 1-34(1). Thus the Draft expands
co-decision by including it as part of the normal legislative process, as opposed to an articleby-article amendment of substantive treaty provisions.
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common defense and cooperation in freedom, security and justice. 6 A
final article in this section contains procedures for enhanced cooperation
among groups of Member States in circumstances in which the entire
Union is unable to act.57
Title VI-The Democratic Life of the Union. These eight provisions respond to demands for more trappings of democracy within the
EU.59 They demand equality for all EU citizens and guarantee openness
and transparency in the workings of the Union's institutions. The varied
articles include a right of citizen initiative, the work of a European Ombudsman, protection of personal data, and Union respect for the status of
churches and other organizations under national law.
Title VII-The Union's Finances.' A concise summary of the EU's
budgetary system and processes is presented in four articles.
Title VIII-The Union and its Immediate Environment. 6' This is a
single provision that calls for the EU to establish close relationships with
neighboring states.
Title IX-Union Membership. 62 These three provisions deal with accession to the EU, suspension of the rights of a Member State that
violates the Union's core values and voluntary withdrawal of a State
from the Union. The articles on accession and suspension have antecedents in the Treaties,63 while the provision on withdrawal is
unprecedented.
6
2. Part II: The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union 4

This part of the Constitution incorporates the Charter that had previously been adopted as a "solemn proclamation" of the EU, but was not
CONST. arts. 1-40-1-43. Activities relating to the common foreign and security pol56.
icy (the TEU's Second Pillar) and cooperation and justice in home affairs (Third Pillar) are
currently subject to their own types of legislation, such as "common strategies," "joint actions" and "common positions" in the Second Pillar, and "common positions," "framework
decisions," "decisions:' and "conventions" in the Third Pillar. TEU arts. 13-15, 34. Under the
Constitution, these types of legislative activity ostensibly will be carried out within the same
six categories as all other forms of EU legislation. However, see comments in Part IV.D of this
article.
57.
CONST. art. 1-44.
58.
Id. at arts. 1-45-1-52.
59.
For an extended analysis of the European Union's "democratic deficit" and how the
Constitution will affect democratic rights and processes within the EU, see Stephen C. Sieberson, The Proposed European Union Constitution-Will it Eliminate the EU's Democratic
Deficit?, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 173 (2004).
60.
CONST. arts. 1-53-1-56.
61.
Id. at art. 1-57.
62.
Id. at arts. 1-58-1-60.
TEU art. 49 (regarding accession); TEU art. 7, EC TREATY art. 309 (regarding sus63.
pension of rights).
CoNsT. arts. 11-61-11-114.
64.
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included in the Treaties." Part II consists of its own Preamble and fiftyfour concise articles that are divided into titles designated as Dignity,
Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizens' Rights, and Justice. With the
inclusion of the Charter in the text of the Constitution, the European Union will finally have a bill of rights at the core of its legal system.
66
3. Part III: The Policies and Functioning of the Union

The longest part of the Constitution with 322 articles, Part III incorporates much of the text of the EC Treaty and TEU. It contains
considerable detail on the internal market, social, economic and monetary policy, external action and the competences of the EU institutions.
The following is a summary of its seven titles:
Title I-Clauses of General Application. 67 These eight provisions
express general operating principles and objectives for the Union.
Title fl-Non-Discrimination and Citizenship. 6 This brief section of
seven articles restates certain civil rights of EU citizens, such as the
rights to move and reside freely within the Union. Concepts of equality
and non-discrimination are also reiterated.
Title III-Internal Policies and Action.69 One of the most substantial
sections in the Constitution, this title consists of 156 articles, divided as
follows: Chapter I on the internal market, including competition law;
Chapter II on economic and monetary policy; Chapter III on certain specific areas such as employment, social policy, agriculture, environment,
consumer protection, transport and energy; Chapter IV on border policies, immigration, asylum and police and judicial cooperation; and
Chapter V on areas in which the EU may take action complementary to
that of the Member States, including public health, industry, culture,
education and civil protection.
Title IV-Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories.7 °
This brief section of six articles contains special provisions governing
the relationship between the Union and the overseas countries and territories of several Member States.
Title V-The Union's External Action.7' Various external matters
have been consolidated into this section, whose thirty-eight articles are
65.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, O.J. (C 364)
1, 5 (2000). For an analysis of the Charter and its background, see Giorgio Sacerdoti, The
European Charterof FundamentalRights: From a Nation-State Europe to a Citizens' Europe,
8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 37 (2002).
66.
CONST. arts. 111-115-111-436.
67.
Id. at arts. III-115-111-122.
68.
Id. at arts. 111-123-111-129.
69.
Id. at arts. 111-130-111-285.
70.
Id. at arts. 111-286-111-291.
71.
Id. at arts. 111-292-111-329.
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divided into eight chapters. Most notably, the chapters cover the TEU's
second and third pillars, relating to a common foreign security policy
(including defense) and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Other subjects include a common trade policy, restrictive trade
measures, humanitarian aid, the EU's conclusion of international agreements and joint responses to terrorist attacks or disasters.
Title VI-The Functioning of the Union.72 Another lengthy section,
the ninety-four articles of this title are divided into three chapters. Chapter I contains detail on the EU institutions and advisory bodies, most of
which was imported from the EC Treaty. Chapter II governs the Union's
budget and multi-annual financial framework. Chapter III offers details
about enhanced cooperation among groups of Member States.
Title VII--Common Provisions. A final section of thirteen articles
deals with certain capacities of the Union and rights of the Member
States, as well as several miscellaneous provisions.
4. Part IV: General and Final Provisions 74
The final part of the Constitutional text consists of twelve varied articles that deal with subjects such as the repeal of the EC Treaty and
TEU, the continuity of the EU and its succession to the rights and obligations of the European Community. Procedures are described for the
Constitution's ratification and entry into force, and there are provisions
governing future amendments to the document.75
B. The Positive Results
As noted in the previous section, the Constitution offers a number of
important institutional and procedural changes to the European Union,
including a more permanent European Council Presidency, a new Union
Minister for Foreign Affairs, a smaller Commission, a revised formula
for qualified majority voting in the Council and European Council, and
more co-decision for the European Parliament. Of more interest for this
analysis, however, are those changes that make the Constitution a more
coherent document than the existing Treaties.
Among the Constitution's innovations that reflect both substantive
improvement and simplification are the following:
Id. at arts. 111-330-Il-423.
Id. at arts. 111-424-111-436.
73.
Id. at arts. IV-437-IV-448.
74.
The standard amendment procedure would require a new convention or an intergov75.
emmental conference, plus eventual ratification by all Member States. Id. at art. 1-9. More
streamlined procedures, not requiring a convention or IGC, are provided for changing unanimous voting requirements or special legislative procedures in Part Il and revising internal
Union policies in Part IH. Id. at arts. IV-444, IV-445.

72.
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The EC Treaty and the TEU are merged into a single text.76
The European Union replaces the European Community, and
all references to the Community are excised.

*

The three pillars of the TEU are scrapped, although their subjects of activity remain intact.

"

In connection with elimination of the pillars, there is a reduction in the types of EU legal instruments.77

"

The Constitution provides a much clearer delineation of the
relative competences of the Union and the Member States,
even though the actual balance of power is generally unchanged.

Finally, it might be argued that Part I, which offers an unprecedented
snapshot of the EU and its institutions, makes the Constitution more approachable to the average European citizen. 7' This is a contestable point,
however, and will be the subject of further discussion in Part IV.D of this
Article.
C. So Much Text, So Little Style
Unfortunately, the Constitution's length and style leave much to be
desired. Brevity is entirely absent-the text alone, not including protocols, declarations and other addenda, consumes 202 pages in the Official
Journal. The principal reason is that in addition to the newly crafted provisions in Part I and the new subject matter in Part II, Part III of the
Constitution largely retains the substance and particulars of the existing
Treaties. One commentator has asserted that the text's provisions are
"hardly less complex than the treaties they are meant to supplant."7' 9 The
Centre for Applied Policy Research has criticized "the opaque structure
of the text as a whole and the resulting fact that the citizens will find it
difficult to read and comprehend the Constitution." s° Another observer
76.
The EURATOM Treaty would remain in effect see supra note 32, although it would
be amended by the Constitution.
77.
CONST. art. 1-33. See also supra discussion at notes 53-57 and in Part IV.D of this
Article.
78.
Peter Ludlow offers "twenty six reasons for welcoming Part 1 of the Constitution."
Peter Ludlow, EuroComment Briefing Note, No. 2.3, THE THESSALONIKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL,
July 3, 2003, at 27. Likewise, the Constitution overall has been praised for meeting "the key
Laeken objectives of clarity, simplification and logic." Tony Brown, Achieving Balance: Institutions and Member States, THE FEDERAL TRUST ONLINE PAPER 3 (Jan. 2004), at
http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/constitution/l-04.pdf.
79.
Siedentop, supra note 39, at 21.
80.
Janis A. Emmanouilidis & Claus Giering, Light and Shade-An Evaluation of the
Convention's Proposals, in CENTRE FOR APPLIED POLICY RESEARCH, EU REFORM, CONVEN-
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has characterized the document as "depressingly long and wordy" containing too much "EU jargon" and "far too much detail to be easily
8
intelligible to ordinary citizens., ' A commentary has asked: "Did anyone

test-drive the turgid, legalistic text with a sample of citizens from different backgrounds and different countries? This would soon have shown
82
that this text is heavy and rather impenetrable. One writer has decried
the document's "lack of Jeffersonian democratic artistry," 83 while anof an
other has caustically suggested that it possesses "the literary charm
furniture."' 4
flatpack
accompanying
instructions
of
set
unhelpful
Succinctness and artistry aside, a significant challenge in working
with the Constitution's text is the fact that related provisions are scattered throughout the document, rather than presented together. This
compels the reader to jump back and forth through the text, searching for
articles relevant to a particular subject. The following section will highlight the most pronounced examples of this phenomenon.
IV. A

CONFUSING TEXTUAL DIASPORA

The general categories of material that comprise the Constitution
may be broadly described as preambles and statements of objectives,
operating principles, institutional provisions, articles on the forms of EU
legislation, and substantive provisions on human rights, the internal market and other matters. Textual fragmentation is found in each of these
categories.
A. Preambles and Statements of Objectives
An initial observation is that the Constitution contains two preambles, one relating to the entire document and another introducing Part II.
Both contain appropriately lofty statements that provide context and express intent, but it is not clear why two preambles are necessary. Both
speak of common values and shared heritage, while respecting the differences in national cultures. Both emphasize the central role of the
individual in society, the necessity for protecting human rights, and
TION SPOTLIGHT 1 (Aug. 2003). The opaqueness of the Constitution's text has been attributed
to the "continuing elitist nature of EU construction." Hughes, supra note 39, at 6.
Quentin Peel, Europe's constitution misses its moment, FIN. TIMES, June 17, 2003,
81.
at 23.
Head-to-head: Is EU blueprint democratic?, BBC NEWS, June 20, 2003, at
82.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3006156.stm.
John Vinocur, An EU Constitution? No Big Deal, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 25,
83.
2003, at 1.
A draft EU constitution that isfarfrom satisfactory,TIMEs LONDON, May 27, 2003,
84.
at 17.
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respect for law. Important as these principles are, it seems unnecessary to
state them twice. In addition, the function of the Part II preamble is not
obvious. It apparently relates to Part II only, but its ideals might well be
useful to interpret the entire Constitution. On the other hand, the preamble for the entire document is evidently intended to serve the entire text,
including Part II, but it could also be argued that the more specific Part II
preamble should supersede its more general counterpart with regard to
interpretation of Part II.
Parts I and III do not have preambles as such, but they contain
statements of objectives that serve a similar function. Title I of Part I is
captioned "Definition and Objectives of the Union," and it contains three
provisions that express values comparable to those included in the preambles--equality, human rights, non-discrimination, and the rule of
law.85 Likewise, Title I of Part III broadly requires the Union to act with
consistency, 86 promote equality of the sexes 87 and certain social rights,881
combat all forms of discrimination,89 protect the environment and promote sustainable development, 9° protect the rights of consumers,91
respect the welfare of animals, 92 and behave with fiscal responsibility.93
While most of these articles expressly relate to Union activity under Part
III, curiously two of the provisions are not so limited. 94 An additional
statement of objectives is Article 111-292, which identifies many of the
same values as principles to guide the EU's external action.95
None of the referenced provisions in Parts I and III contain sufficient
detail to be qualitatively distinguishable from the preambles, and thus
their purpose might be questioned. Their placement as textual articles is
not explained, nor is it clear whether their inclusion in the text gives
them more authority than similar statements in the preambles. Quite obviously, they could be included in the preambles, but they are not. As the
above description demonstrates, the drafters of the Constitution have
chosen a decidedly random approach in expressing the ideals for the Union.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

CONST. arts. 1-2-1-4.
Id. at art. III- 115.
Id. at art. 111-116.
Id. at art. 111-117.
Id. at art. In-118.
Id. at art. 111-119.
Id. at art. 111- 120.
Id. at art. 111-121.
Id. at art. 111-122.
Id. at arts. 111-120, 111-122.
Id. at art. 111-292.
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B. Competences and OperationalConcepts
The Constitution contains critical information about the powers assigned to the EU, and how the Union and Member States may function
within the EU system. Finding this information, however, requires
searching through various parts of the document.
The Union's competences are conferred by the Member States. This
is a key concept that is described at several points in the Constitution. Its
first expression is found in Article I-1, which states that the Constitution
establishes the Union, "on which the Member States confer competences*"9 6 The same provision requires the EU to pursue Member State
objectives by exercising the competences conferred by the States. Article
1-11 then reiterates twice that conferral is granted by the Member
States.97 Implying conferral by the States without specifically mentioning
them, Article 1-1 11 (1) links activities under the Charter with the limits
of Union power "as conferred on it in the other Parts of the Constitution." 98 Similarly, Article 111-115 emphasizes that the Union must act
under Part III "in accordance with the principle of conferring of powers. '99 These repeated reminders of the conferral principle may be seen
as nothing more than appropriate emphasis of the doctrine. Their placement, however, lacks a clear pattern, and, moreover, there are other
references to conferral that confuse the issue by describing Union competences as being conferred by the Constitution itself rather than by the
Member States.'0°

Union action is restricted by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, and Article 1-11 provides useful definitions of the two
terms. Subsidiarity requires that EU action in areas outside its exclusive
competence may be taken only if the Member States cannot effectively
accomplish the intended objective.'0 ' Proportionality limits any Union
action to what is "necessary to achieve the objectives of the Constitution."'0 2 Much more detail on the application of these principles is found
3
in a protocol attached to the Constitution,' and Article I-11 helpfully
refers to the supplemental document. Article I- 11, however, fails to mention another relevant protocol, also attached to the Constitution.' This
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at art. I-1(1).
Id. at arts. I- 11(1), 1-11(2).
Id. at art. I-111(1).
Id. at art. II1-115.
Id. at arts. 1-12(1), 1-12(2), 1-14(1). See also id. at arts. 1-3(5), 1-6.
Id. at art. 1-11(3).
Id. at art. I-11 (4).
See CONST. PROTOCOL ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SUBSIDIARITY

AND PROPORTIONALITY

104.

[hereinafter

PROTOCOL ON SUBSIDIARITY].

See CONST. PROTOCOL ON THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE EURO-

PEAN UNION

[hereinafter

PROTOCOL ON NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS].
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additional document contains procedural details regarding the role of
Member State parliaments in reviewing proposed legislation against the
subsidiarity and proportionality requirements.' 5
"Enhanced cooperation" is a procedure that permits groups of Member States to engage in joint activity, using EU institutions, when action
by the Union as a whole is not possible. '°6 Article 1-44 of the Constitution offers a useful overview of the procedure.' 7 Critical details are
'08 however,
found in Part II,
and in this instance the drafters of Article I44 helpfully included cross references to the related provisions.' °9 But the
Constitution does contain additional cooperative procedures that are not
mentioned in Article 1-44 or its Part III counterparts. For example, in the
area of common security and defense policy, there are mechanisms created for "permanent structured cooperation" among groups of Member
States who might act on the Union's behalf," or "commitments and cooperation" among States for mutual defense."' One further cooperative
measure is found in Part IV, in which the Benelux "regional union" is
specifically approved." 2 Like enhanced cooperation, the mechanisms for
permanent structured cooperation are introduced in Part I of the Constitution and elaborated in Part III.' Regarding commitments and
cooperation on defense, Article 1-41(7) refers not to Part Ill but to the
Member States' obligations under NATO and under the United Nations
14
Charter."
Another operational concept that is covered in both Part I and Part
III of the Constitution is the financial and budgetary scheme for the Union. The provisions in Part I comprise a separate title, "The Union's
Finances, and they offer general principles for EU revenue and ex' 7
penditure," 6 along with descriptions of the Union's financial resources, 1
the multiannual financial framework" 8 and the annual budget." 9 The real

105.

106.

Id. at arts. 1-4.

For a description of the Convention's negotiations over enhanced cooperation, see

NORMAN supra note 38, at 99, 117, 186, 242-43.
107.
CONST. art. 1-44.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.at arts. 111-416-111-423.
Id. at arts. 1-44(1), 1-44(2).
Id. at art. 1-41(6).
Id. at art. 1-41(7).
Id. at art. IV-441.
Id. at art. II1-312.

114.

Id. at art. 1-41(7).

115.

Id. at arts. 1-53-1-56.

116.

Id. at art. 1-53.

117.
118.
119.

Id. at art. 1-54.
Id. at art. 1-55.
Id. at art. 1-56.
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nuts and bolts, however, are to be found in Part 111,120 whose provisions
are partially cross-referenced in Part I.
The foregoing examples illustrate the Convention's apparent intention
to use Part I of the Constitution to lay out the basic principles of how the
Union is to act and under what authority it may do so. Unfortunately, the
drafters have failed to include all of the relevant material in Part I or have
failed to provide adequate cross references to related provisions in Part III.
C. The Institutions and TheirActivities
Among the innovative sections of Part I, its Title IV provides an
2
overview of the Union's institutions.1 ' Article 1-19 identifies the primary
institutions and states their objectives, while ensuing articles offer basic
descriptions of each body. Additional provisions deal with key matters
such as the presidencies of the European Council and Commission, the
new Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, formations of the Council and
the revised system of qualified majority voting on the European Council
and Council.
As a summary, Title IV of Part I is useful, but as governing text it is
grossly incomplete. All of the following institutions or bodies are introthe
duced in Part I, but with important details reserved for Part III:
24 the
23
22
Council,'
the
European Parliament, the European Council,
27
26
Commission, 25 the Court of Justice, the European Central Bank, the
2 9
Court of Auditors, 28 the Committee of the Regions, and the Economic
30 In addition, Part III contains provisions, not
and Social Committee.
reflected in Part I, relating to the European Ombudsman' and the European Investment Bank.12 Part III also contains a number of procedural
33
articles affecting all of the EU's institutions and other bodies.'
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at arts. Il-402-111-415.
Id. at arts. 1-19-1-32.
Id. at arts. 1-20, 111-330-111-340.
Id. at arts. 1-21-1-22, 1-25,111-341.
Id. at arts. 1-23-1-25, 111-342-111-346.
Id. at arts. 1-26-1-28, 111-347-111-352.
Id. at arts. 1-29, 111-353-111-381. In addition to the Constitutional text, there is an

extensive Statute of the Court of Justice. See Const.

PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE

COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION.

127.

CONST. arts. 1-30, 111-382-111-383. There is also a protocol on the ECB. See CONST.

THE EUROPROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS AND
BANK.
PEAN CENTRAL

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at arts. 1-31,111-384-111-385.
Id. at arts. 1-32, 1-386-III-388.
Id. at arts. 1-32, 111-389-111-392.
Id. at art. 237.
Id. at arts. 111-393-111-394.
Id. at arts. 111-395-111-401.
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Furthermore, several protocols
to the Constitution describe the function34
ing of the institutions.'
Voting rules for the institutions are found in Parts I, III, and IV of the
Constitution. For the European Parliament, its standard rule of majority
voting is found in Article II-338,135 although other rules may apply.'36

For the European Council, the requirement of consensus voting as the
norm is found in Article 1-21(4), 11 7 but other provisions permit decisions
to be taken by less than a unanimous vote.'3 s Article 1-23(3) provides that
the standard procedure for the Council is to vote by qualified majority
vote, 39 but other voting rules may be found elsewhere throughout the
4
Constitution4 ° and in a draft decision of the Council."
134.
PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION;
PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL
BANKS AND OF THE
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK; PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE EUROPEAN
INVESTMENT
BANK; PROTOCOL ON THE LOCATION OF THE SEATS OF THE INSTITUTIONS
AND OF CERTAIN
BODIES, OFFICES, AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION; PROTOCOL ON
THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION; PROTOCOL
ON THE EURO
GROUP; all in CONST.
135.

CONST.

art. 111-338.

136.
Certain special procedures may require less than a majority or a super-majority. Id.
at arts. 111-333 (one quarter of EP members may set up a Committee of Inquiry), 111-340 (twothirds vote to censure the Commission).
137.
Id. at art. 1-21(4).
138.
Article 1-25 provides two different formulas for qualified majority voting on the
European Council. See text of note 52, supra. For situations calling for QMV, see CONST. arts.
1-22(1) (election of the European Council President), 1-27(1) (selection of the Commission
President), 1-27(2) (appointment of Commission), 1-28(1) (appointment or removal of the
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs), 111-382(2) (appointment of the Executive Board of the
European Central Bank). Abstentions by a member of the European Council will not prevent
unanimous decisions from being taken. Id. at art. 111-341(1). The European Council may adopt
its own procedural rules by simple majority vote. Id. at art. 111-341(3). It may also decide by
simple majority whether to examine proposed amendments to the Constitution and whether to
convene a new constitutional convention. Id. at art. IV-443 (2).
139.
CONST. art. 1-23(3). The voting formulas are found in Article 1-25. Id.
at art. 1-25.
See discussion in note 52 supra.
140.
Some Council votes require only a simple majority. See CONST. arts. 111-208, 111217, 111-344(3), 111-345, 111-346, 111-347, 111-349, 111-428. On the other hand, unanimous
Council voting is required in many instances. See id. at arts. 1-18(1), 1-27(2) (common accord), 1-35(3), 1-40(6), 1-54(3), 1-55(2), 1-58(2), 111-124(1), 111-125(2), 111-126, 111-129, III157(3), 111-158(4), 111-168(2), 111-171(1), 111-173, 111-176, 111-184(13), III-185(6), I-198(3),
111-210(3), II-212(2), 111-223(2), 111-234(2), 1I-237, 1-256(3), II1-269(3), III-270.(2), III271(1), 111-274(1), (4), I-275(3), 111-277, 111-291, 111-295(2), 111-300(1), 111-312(6) (certain
Member States only), 111-315(4), III-325(8), 111-326(1), 111-330(1), (2), 111-348(2), 111-354, 111359(4), 111-386, 111-389, 111-393, 1-395(1), 111-396(9), 111-412(1), (3), 111-419(2), 111-420(2),
111-421, 111-422(l), (2), 111-433, 111-436(2). Note that this list is not exhaustive because certain
other provisions may contain cross-references to the unanimous voting requirements of these
articles. See, e.g., id. at art. 111-405(2). Certain votes relating to the Euro are restricted to
Council members representing Eurozone countries. See id. at arts. 111-194(2), 111-196(3), 111197(4), 111-198(3).
141.
See CONST., Declaration on Article 1-25. The draft decision, which will be adopted
by the Council on the day the Constitution takes effect, permits three-fourths of a blocking
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Because of the described arrangement of the text, anyone studying
the Constitution's institutional provisions must set Part I against the
other parts of the document, including its protocols, to see the whole
picture. In the case of voting rules, the normal procedures are found in
various places, but the exceptions to those rules far outnumber the standards, and a careful search of the full text is necessary to determine
whether one of the many exceptions might apply.
D. Legal Instruments
The Constitution's reduction in the number of permissible legal instruments, as outlined in Article 1-33,' 2 appears on the surface to be a
significant step toward simplifying EU law. A closer look, however, reveals that there are many other legal acts available to the Union. Herwig
Hofmann 4 3 offers a useful analysis, demonstrating that Article 1-33 is by
He notes that the EU will continue to use deleno means exclusive."
S 14514
gated regulations, inter-institutional arrangements, 46 and "soft law
tools" such as "guidelines, vademecums, codexes, notices or circulars to
Member State administrations. 14' 7 Furthermore, Article 1-37(3) calls for
"rules and general principles" for Member States to control the Commis48 and the
sion's exercise of its delegated implementing powers,
themselves take many forms and be
implementing acts of the States 1will
49
part of the system of Union law.
The Constitution also provides various types of direct EU action outside the normal scope and procedures of Article 1-33, including:
5
agreements between the EU and IGOs or third countries, budgetary
5 ' certain acts of the European Parand financial framework decisions,'
liament, 1 2 various forms of "coordinating, complementary or supporting
minority (based on population or numbers of States in such a minority) to force the Council to
reconsider a measure that has received a qualified majority vote. One commentator has noted
that this is "an additional complicating factor" that may interfere with efficient Council operations. GIOVANNI GREVI, LIGHT AND SHADE OF A QUASI-CONSTITUTION-AN ASSESSMENT 8
(EPC Issue Paper No. 14, 2004), available at http://www.theepc.net.
See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
142.
HERWIG C. H. HOFMANN, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NEW TYPOLOGY OF ACTS
143.
IN THE DRAFT TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE (European Integration
Online Papers No. 9, 2003), availableat http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/3003-009.htm.
Id.at 3, 7.
144.
Id. at 9-14; see also CONST., at art. 1-36.
145.
HOFFMAN, supra note 143, at 17-18.
146.
Id. at 7.
147.
CONST. art. 1-37(3).
148.
Id. at art. 1-37(1).
149.
Id. at art. I1-317(2).
150.
Id. at arts. 1-54(3) (requiring Member State ratification), 1-55(4) (permitting the
151.
European Council to change the specified voting procedures).
Id. at arts. 111-330(2), 111-333.
152.
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action""' and actions relating to the common foreign and security policy, 54 common security and defense policy,'55 and the area of freedom,
security, and justice. 56 Finally, amendment of the Constitution itself is
57
subject to special procedures.
The European Union is a complex system, internally and with regard
to its relationship with the Member States. The need for variety and fluidity in the forms of EU action is understandable, and the Constitution
provides ample flexibility. The concern here is that Article 1-33 suggests
a simple approach that does not withstand closer scrutiny.
E. FundamentalRights and EU Citizenship
Part II is the Constitution's Bill of Rights, its great statement of fundamental human rights that must be guaranteed by and within the Union.
But there are additional provisions on the subject. Part I has a title
named "Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the Union."'' 8 In it, Article 1-9 requires the EU to recognize the rights expressed in Part II, and it
calls for the Union to accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR) 5 9 It also incorporates as "general
principles of the Union's law" the fundamental rights arising from the
"constitutional traditions common to the Member States." '6°
The preamble to Part II then refers to these same sources of law and actually
expands on them. It "reaffirms" the rights arising from the "constitutional traditions and internationalobligations common to the Member
States," the ECHR, "the Social Charters adopted by the Union and by the
Council of Europe," the case law of the ECJ and the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights. 6' It further states that Part II will be
interpreted by the ECJ and Member State courts "with due regard" to
certain "explanations" prepared by the Charter Convention, as later updated by the European Convention. 62
153.

Id. at arts. l11-278-II1-285.
Id. at art. 1-40.
155.
Id. at art. 1-41.
156.
Id. at art. 1-42.
157.
Id. at arts. IV-443, IV-444, IV-445.
158.
Id. at arts. 1-9-1-10.
159.
Id. at arts. 1-9(1), 1-9(2).
160.
Id. at art. 1-9(3).
161.
Id. at pt. II Preamble (emphasis added).
162.
Id. A logical question is whether these explanations should be treated as part of the
Constitution itself, subject to amendment only through the elaborate process required to
amend the Constitution. A difficulty presented in this analysis is the fact that the explanations
themselves are prefaced with the statement that "they do not as such have the status of law."
Praesidium, Updated Explanations relating to the text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,

154.

July 18, 2003, CONV 828/1/03 REV 1 at 2. For an analysis of this point, see HOFMANN, supra
note 143, at 20.
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Closely related to "fundamental rights" are EU citizenship rights and
principles of democracy within the Union. Article 1-10 guarantees Union
citizens the right to "move and reside freely" in any Member State, the
right as a resident to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal and
European Parliament elections, certain rights to diplomatic and consular
assistance from any Member State and the right to deal with EU institutions in any official EU language.'63 Part II repeats the grant of rights
relating to voting and standing for election, 6" and Part III, in its own title
on "Non-Discrimination and Citizenship,"'65 contemplates additional
Union legislation relating to citizens' rights. 66 An additional set of principles in Part I is entitled "The Democratic Life of the Union."' 67 Once
again, equality is demanded, 6 and citizens are offered access to the EU
institutions,' 69 transparency in institutional activities,'70 personal data priof an ombudsman to address grievances about
vacy' and the assistance
72
the institutions.'
While the Constitution's guarantee of human rights is a positive development, its approach is highly complicated. Substantive provisions on
individual rights are scattered throughout Parts I, II, and III, and there is
considerable repetition among them, a situation characterized by one
commentator as "pointless duplications.' 73 Furthermore, the incorporation of the ECHR, constitutional traditions and international obligations
common to the Member States, Social Charters of the EU, and Council
of Europe, case law of two courts, and official explanations of the original Charter means that the text of the Constitution, however presented, is
not the last word on the subject. Interestingly, Articles 11-111-113 recognize the interplay among the various systems of rights, and they attempt
to offer guidance in applying the different schemes.' 71 Unfortunately,
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

CONST. art. 1-10(2).
Id. at arts. 1-99, I-100.
Id. at arts. 111-123-111-129.
Id. at arts. III-125-III-128.
Id. at arts. 1-45-1-52.
Id. at arts. 1-45.

169.

Id. at arts. 1-45-1-47.

170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at arts. 1-47(2), 1-50.
Id. at arts. 1-51.
Id. at arts. 1-49.

A "TI3 (The Federal Trust for
Education and Research Online Paper 27/03, 2003), at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/
constitution/27_03.pdf. Other commentators have criticized the overlap between human rights
provisions in Part I and Part II of the Constitution, noting that this "weakens the structural
clarity of the text. Furthermore, differing formulations may well lead to legal uncertainties."
MICHAEL DOUGAN, THE CONVENTION'S DRAFT CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY:

DYING-UP EXERCISE" THAT NEEDS SOME TIDYING-UP OF ITS OWN,

Emmanouilidis, supra note 80, at 3.

174.

CONST.

arts. II-111-II-113.
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these provisions are themselves complex,17 ' and it is likely that the European Court of Justice will eventually be called upon to determine the
hierarchy of these various sets of principles and to sort out any inconsistencies in how they are worded.
F. The InternalMarket and OtherSubjects of EU Law

Consistent with the pattern established for other provisions, the
drafters of the Constitution have utilized Part I to debut most of the substantive areas of EU action, while reserving the essential detail for Part
III. These fields include: the internal market; 7 1 monetary policy for the
Eurozone Member States;' 77 economic and social policy;' external action; 79 common foreign and security policy;8 ° common security and
defense policy;' and "the area of freedom, security and justice."'82 The
elaboration in Part III largely mirrors the text of the Treaties on these
subjects, and, as noted, the introductory references in Part I are unprecedented.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

In broad terms, the Convention has taken the EC Treaty and TEU
and combined them as Part III of the new Constitution. They have added
175.
For example, the Charter usually refers to rights, but occasionally to principles, and
the two can be combined. "[E]xamples for principles recognised in the Charter include e.g.
Articles 25, 26, and 37. In some cases, an Article of the Charter may contain both elements of
a right and of a principle, e.g., Articles 22, 33, and 34." Updated Explanations relating to the
text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 162, at 51. Article 11-111 (1) states that
rights must be "respected," while principles must be "observed." CONST. art. 11-111 (1). Article
11-112(5) then sets out to clarify the proper implementation of principles. Id. at art. 11-112(5).
One commentator has described the attempted clarification as "problematic" and "ambiguous." DOUGAN, supra note 173, at 3.
176.
CONST. arts. 1-13(1) (regarding competition rules relating to the internal market), I14(2) (the internal market generally), 111- 130-111-176.
177.
Id. at arts. 1-13(1), 1-15(2), 1-30, 1I-177, 111-185-11-202.
178.
In Part I, see Id. at arts. 1-12(3), 1-14(2), 1-15(1), 1-17. In Part II,see Id. at arts. I11177-IlH-184 (regarding economic policy), III-203-IHI-208 (employment policy), 1-209-III115 (social policy), 111-220-I1-224 (economic, social and territorial cohesion), 111-225-I1/232 (agriculture and fisheries), 111-233-II1-234 (environment), 11-235 (consumer protection),
111-236-111-245 (transport), 111-246-111-247 (trans-European networks), 111-248-11-255 (research and technological development, and space), 111-256 (energy), 1-278-1II-285 (industry,
human health, education, culture, tourism and civil protection). For a discussion of the complex relationship between EU and Member State competence in these fields, see Sieberson,
supra note 46, at 27-28.
179.
CONST. arts. 1-3(4), -14(4), 1-57, 1I-286-111-291,111-292-111-293,111-314-III-328.
180.
Id. at arts. 1-12(4), 1-16, 1-28, 1-40, 111-294-111-313.
181.
Id. at arts. 1-12(4), 1-41,111-309-111-312, 111-329, 111-436.
182.
Id. at arts. 1-14(2), 1-42, 11-257-111-277.
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Part I as an overview of the Union and its competences and institutions,
Part II as a bill of rights, and Part IV as a housekeeping section. Despite
the real improvements mentioned earlier in this Article, is it really legitimate to describe this overall construct as a simplification?
From a drafting point of view, Part I is arguably the most problematic
section of the Constitution. Ironically, it is offered as an easy-to-digest,
inspirational introduction to the European Union, a succinct rendition of
the EU's components and characteristics. But in this attempt to make the
Constitution more approachable and understandable, the drafters of the
document have actually created a deception. Just as a movie's promotional
trailer may fall to reflect the true quality of the entire film, Part I's sneak
preview fails to reveal the full plot of the Constitution. Virtually every one
of the provisions of Part I is amplified, clarified or limited by articles
elsewhere in the document. Thus, the Convention has presented the European citizen with a set of basic statements, none of which can be relied
upon without an exegetical foray into Parts II, I1 and IV.83 The unhappy
conclusion is that this arrangement actually increases the complexity of
the Constitution under the guise of simplification.
For years to come the Constitution will be scrutinized by experts in
every field of Union activity. Concerns over institutional power and the
intricate subtleties of substantive law will supply ample motivation for
ever deeper analysis of the new document, coupled with suggestions for
its amendment. It is beyond the scope of this Article-or any other single
commentary, for that matter-to adequately describe the substantive
successes or failures of the Constitution. However, given the preConvention demands for a clearer, simpler successor to the Treaties, and
in light of the textual analysis in Part IV of this Article, two straightforward means of improving the Constitution's text are offered.
A. Reeling in the Related Provisions

The first suggestion is to eliminate as much of the textual fragmentation as possible. Related and overlapping provisions should be presented
together, so the reader can have confidence that the presentation of a particular subject is relatively complete. Where competing considerations
Janis A. Emmanouilidis and Claus Giering have noted that Part I "is not enough to
183.
provide EU citizens with a clear-cut picture of the EU as a constitutional community," and that
"the rights, obligations, aims and limits of the European Union become apparent only after
one has read more than 460 articles." Emmanouilidis, supra note 80, at 3.
184.
For a wide-ranging set of substantive improvements proposed by a group of academics for the July 18, 2003 draft of the Constitution, see The Federal Trust, Making it our
Own-A trans-Europeanproposal on amending the draft Constitutional Treaty for the European Union, (May 2004), available at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk. For an overall evaluation of
the final version of the Constitution, see GREVI, supra note 141.
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necessitate that significant, related material be presented elsewhere,
cross references should be used if possible.'85 This process of regrouping
related articles will create a felicitous side benefit, namely, the opportunity to eliminate redundancies and clear up inconsistencies.
Looking back to Part IV of this Article, the following are examples
of how the Constitution might be rearranged to bring an end to the textual diasporas:
*

The preambles and statements of objectives should be combined into a single preamble for the entire document.

"

References to the conferral principle should be consolidated
into a single article in Part I and thereafter reiterated only
where necessary.

"

The protocol on subsidiarity should be incorporated into Article I-11, and the protocol on the role of Member State
parliaments should be brought forward into the text of the
Constitution.

"

The textual material on enhanced cooperation should be combined, preferably in Part I.

*

The budgetary and financial provisions should be brought together, again preferably in Part I.

*

All of the institutional provisions in Part III and the relevant
protocols should be incorporated into the introductory articles
in Part I.

"

Exceptions to the standard institutional voting rules should be
identified in a single article in Part I for each institution. For
clarity, these references to special voting requirements may be
repeated in the relevant articles in Part III, but a single initial
list of these exceptions will present a more complete portrayal
of how each institution operates.

*

To account for the additional types of legal instruments beyond the new Basic Six, Article 1-33 should be expanded to
describe other means of action available to the EU institutions.

*

Because of the symbolic importance of describing fundamental rights in a separate part of the Constitution, Part II should
be retained, but the related provisions in Parts I and II should
be incorporated into the Charter. Additionally, and more con-

185.

Article 1-44 offers a useful demonstration of cross-references. CONST. art. 1-44.
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troversially, the Charter should be given its full due, and references to the other sources of rights should be deleted.
Critical principles from those other sources, if not currently
found in the Charter, should be expressed as provisions of the
Charter.
The allocation of competences between the EU and the Member States should be retained in Part I, and this must of
necessity include certain references to substantive areas of
action. All other references to substantive matters, such as
Articles 1-40 to 42, should be moved to their related sections
in Part III.
What emerges from the foregoing is a substantially expanded Part I of
the Constitution, covering most of the institutional detail currently divided between Parts I and I. At the same time, the function of Part III is
clarified-it becomes the substantive law section of the document. Parts
II and IV remain relatively intact. The benefit of this approach is that the
different parts of the Constitution will no longer overlap, but will have
different purposes. Part I will describe in full detail the Union and its
institutions. Part II will be a stand-alone Bill of Rights. Part III will
cover all of the subjects of EU activity. Part IV will continue as a brief
set of technical provisions.
The chief victim of this approach would be the putative stylistic elegance of Part I in its current form. This is a sacrifice well worth making.
The sense of order resulting from this restructuring would bring the
Constitution much closer to the people than do the streamlined but misleading introductory provisions of the current document.
B. A Streamlined Constitution-a "Basic Treaty"
The bolder approach would be to essentially retain Parts I, II and IV
(amended as described in the preceding section) as the "basic treaty"
contemplated in the Laeken Declaration, 8 6 relegating most of Part III to
the realm of legislation. Such an instrument would have the look and feel
of the rearranged document described in the preceding section, but without many of the substantive provisions of Part III.
Critical features of the shortened Constitution would include the following:
•

A single preamble or statement of objectives.

"

Clear statements on conferral, subsidiarity, and primacy of
EU law.

186.

See supra text accompanying note 33.
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*

Delineation of competences granted to the EU and reserved to
the Member States.

"

Essential detail on the institutions, the EU legislative process,
legal instruments, and the Union budget.

"

A comprehensive list of exceptions to the standard institutional voting rules.

•

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union.

The obvious practical benefit of pruning most of Part III from the Constitution is that in matters where unanimity is not politically required it
will not be necessary to suffer through the constitutional amendment
process to change the law. 187 Given the vast detail in Part III, its provisions will undoubtedly require constant fine-tuning as the Union
continues to evolve,' and the EU would be well-served to facilitate the
necessary textual changes.' 89 A related benefit is that when the ECJ interprets Part III, the other EU institutions will more easily be able to
override the Court by changing the law.' 9° As long as Part III is constitu187.
The ordinary amendment procedure requires a constitutional convention or IGC,
plus ratification by all of the Member States. CONST. art. IV-443. Even the streamlined procedures relating to Part III require either acquiescence by the Member State parliaments
(objection by even one parliament will block the amendment) or affirmative ratification by all
States. Id. at arts. IV-444, IV-445.
188.
For example, Roger Goebel has argued that the inclusion of complex and detailed
provisions on economic and monetary union in the existing treaties is troublesome simply
because even minor changes will be subject to the "time-consuming and cumbersome" treaty
amendment process. Roger J. Goebel, European Economic and Monetary Union: Will the
EMU Ever Fly?, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, 287 (1998). See TEU art. 48 for the existing treaty
amendment requirements. Essentially all of the EMU provisions referenced by Goebel are
retained in the Constitution.
189.
Commentators Emmanouilidis and Giering have noted that removing the "nonconstitutional" provisions from the document would "provide the EU with the ability to
amend the latter on the basis of a less complex procedure." Emmanouilidis, supra note 80, at
7. In a similar vein, columnist George Will has aptly observed that "[a] proper constitution
does not give canonical status, as rights elevated beyond debate, to the policy preferences of
the moment." George Will, EU should really study America's Constitution, REGISTER GUARD
(Eugene, OR), Jul. 29, 2003, at Al1. He adds: "The more detailed a constitution is in presenting particular political outcomes as elevated beyond the reach of changeable majorities, the
more quickly it is sure to seem dated." Id.
190.
U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Stephen Breyer has commented that the EU's
legislative processes, which should enable the EU institutions to override ECJ rulings, significantly restrict the ability of the institutions to respond. This is because ECJ decisions
involving treaty interpretation can be set aside only by amending the relevant treaty. The problem, according to Breyer, is that "in light of the length and the detailed nature of the ECJ's
'constitution' (namely, the basic treaties), many more ECJ decisions will likely rest upon 'constitutional' grounds." Stephen Breyer, Constitutionalism, Privatization, and Globalization:
Changing Relationships Among European ConstitutionalCourts, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1045,
1053 (2000). The result is that "it is difficult for member states or other EC institutions to
revise ECJ decisions with which they disagree." Id. at 1052. Breyer compares this situation
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tional, a simple legislative response to a judicial ruling on Part III will be
impossible. Thus, whether to enable legislation to reflect changing times
or to deal with an unwelcome court decision, a simpler amendment
process seems imperative to permit the political will to be exercised efficiently at the EU level.
By including in the more abbreviated Constitution a full recitation of
voting rules and exceptions, especially detailing those instances in which
the Council must act unanimously, the delicate balance of power between the EU and its Member States would not be altered. This balance
would also be preserved by continuing to require unanimity to amend the
Constitution.' 9' Granted, any requirement of consensus either in legislation or in the constitutional amendment process may be a recipe for
stagnation, 9 2 but the point of this analysis is to suggest that the Constitution could be streamlined without upsetting the existing political
applecart. 93
VI. CONCLUSION
To conclude this analysis, it is useful to recall the challenges posed
in the Laeken Declaration'9 and to gauge how the Convention and IGC
have responded:
1. The challenge: "[S]implifying the existing Treaties without changing their content. Should a distinction between the Union and the
Communities be reviewed? What of the division into three pillars?" The
result: The two main Treaties have been melded, the substantive content
has generally been preserved, and the balance of power between the
with the United States, where constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court are "very difficult
to overturn" but where decisions on statutory or administrative grounds can be set aside by
"only a new statute or reconsideration by the relevant agency." Id.
191.

See supra note 187.

192.
Prior to the Convention, Commission President Prodi had warned that in an
enlarged EU, a treaty that can be amended only by consensus might well become "fossilized."
Youri Devuyst, The European Union's Constitutional Order? Between Community Method
and Ad Hoc Compromise, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 33 (2000).

It should be noted that there was discussion at the Convention regarding the draft193.
ing of a basic treaty. NORMAN, supra note 38, at 22, 63, 85. There were also proposals to
relegate much of the Part III detail to a body of "organic law" falling somewhere between the
Constitution and ordinary EU legislation. Id. at 66, 105. The Federal Trust group has commented on the benefits of a set of organic laws. The Federal Trust, supra note 184, at 26.
Likewise, Herwig Hofmann comments that creation of organic laws would permit a shorter
Constitution, but he also cautions that the new category might also "increase the overall complexity of the legal system." HOFMANN, supra note 143, at 21. He also argues that removing
the full detail of the Treaties from the Constitution would have weakened Member State influence over "a large range of matters." Id. at 22. Neither approach was accepted, and the
Constitution actually expands rather than contracts the text of the Treaties.
194.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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Union and its Member States has largely been maintained. The Communities are replaced by the Union in all respects. The three pillars are also
officially eliminated, although they have survived in spirit.
2. The challenge: "[T]he possible reorganisation of the Treaties.
Should a distinction be made between a basic treaty and the other treaty
provisions? Should this distinction involve separating the texts? Could
this lead to a distinction between the amendment and ratification procedures for the basic treaty and for the other treaty provisions?" The result:
Although it may look like a basic treaty, Part I of the Constitution is part
of, not separate from, the document. This Article contends that the extra
text in Part I, as currently presented, actually creates more confusion
than clarity. The new, somewhat simpler amendment procedures for certain provisions in Part I11H95 are an exceedingly modest step.
3. The challenge: "Thought would also have to be given to whether
the Charter of Fundamental Rights should be included in the basic treaty
and to whether the European Community should accede to the European
Convention on Human Rights." The result: Both of these have been accomplished, but the overall treatment of human rights and their sources
is unduly complicated.
4. The challenge: "The question ultimately arises as to whether this
simplification and reorganisation might not lead in the long run to the
adoption of a constitutional text in the Union. What might the basic features of such a constitution be? The values which the Union cherishes,
the fundamental rights and obligations of its citizens, the relationship
between Member States in the Union?" The result: A constitution has
been crafted, and it both preserves the Union's values and maintains the
sensitive political balance between the EU and its Member States.
Overall, it is incontestable that the Constitution is an improvement
over the existing Treaties and that it has met many of the goals set at
Laeken. Nevertheless, what of the broader goals of simplification and
making EU law more accessible and easily understood? It is perhaps
wishful thinking to expect that the average EU citizen could ever readily
grasp any constitutional document, but can it not at least be more transparent? Can it not be more approachable to the person willing to make
the effort?
Perhaps the blame for the ponderous nature of this document should
be placed on the Convention process, which relied on separate working
groups but lacked an influential style committee. Or it might have been a
manifestation of the old adage: "If I'd had more time I would have written you a shorter letter." Most likely, however, it was the political
necessity of finding acceptability among the greatest number of deci195.

See supra note 187.
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sion-makers. Despite the innovative spirit that led to the drafting of Part I
of the Constitution, the Convention displayed an inherent conservatism,
a sense of caution that produced Part III with the look and feel of the
existing Treaties. The competing spirits led to inclusion of both parts,
and the result is not felicitous.
Given the difficulty of accomplishing dramatic change in the diverse
and complex EU, it is only fair in the end to credit the Convention and
the IGC for agreeing on any version of a constitution, regardless of its
literary shortcomings. Nevertheless, despite the obvious successes of the
venture, this Article has suggested that the Constitution is amenable to
significant improvement without a major political shift. Although a
shorter, basic document is appealing, even a mere rearranging of the current text would afford a meaningful gain. Perhaps all that is needed is
more time. Whether in three years, or five, or ten, it will soon enough be
necessary to amend the Constitution for reasons of substance and policy.
In the meantime, interested scholars and politicians can quietly work
together to create a stylistic makeover that can be widely tested for its
political acceptability prior to the time for amendment. The people of
Europe deserve a constitution that is well crafted. Creating such a document is a task worth doing.

